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VOLUME 3 JUNE, 1958 NUMBER 4
THE BACKGROUND AND PUBLIC POLICY OF PENNSYL-
VANIA LAW ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREE-
MENTS-UNSHACKLING THE HOLD OF
THE COMMON LAW.
I. HERMAN STERN t
P ENNSYLVANIA is recognized as one of the leading common
law jurisdictions in the United States. Colonial Pennsylvania
accepted the early English law in full measure-both its statutory as
well as its common law.' This meant the acceptance, of course, of the
common law principle of stare decisis. The common law's major con-
tribution to our system of jurisprudence has been stability, certainty
and predictability; and in this respect, the principle of stare decisis-
the giving of credence and effect to precedent-has played a prime role.
This is essentially as it should be, since the predictable element in the
law is truly one of the fundamental attributes of any workable system of
jurisprudence.
The common law of Pennsylvania, in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, on collective labor action and the collective labor agreement
was restrictive in nature and hostile in mood. It effectively strangled
the growth of labor unions by applying to collective bargaining the
doctrines of conspiracy and restraint of trade. Since 1931, and more
particularly since 1937, Pennsylvania law on this score is no longer
governed by the dead weight of these two common law principles. This
t Associate Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law. B.S. 1936,
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; M.A. 1942, University of Pennsylvania;
LL.B 1948, Temple University. Treasurer, Section on Labor and Industry, Pennsyl-
vania Bar Association; Member, Pennsylvania and Philadelphia Bars.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 152 (1952). It is interesting to note that the judges
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1808 examined and reported to the Legis-
lature which of the English Statutes were in force in the state and which of such
statutes in their opinion should be incorporated into the statutory laws. The judges
modestly reported that "... the legislature will easily perceive the difficulties
attending the report now presented to them. . . ." 3 Bin. 595-626 (Pa. 1808).
(441)
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change has been effected by statutorily declared public policy and
substantive legislative enactments.
The spirit as well as the letter of Pennsylvania law has changed.
The Anti-Injunction Act of 1931 2 and thereafter the 1937 Labor Re-
lations Act ' and the Labor Anti-Injunction Act " have been responsible
in large part for this change. These acts have extirpated the antag-
onistic policy of Pennsylvania law established by the stare decisis
resulting from adjudications and judgments in cases decided prior to
1931. Since 1937, Pennsylvania public policy encourages collective
bargaining and collective labor agreements. Rules of law gleaned from
cases decided prior to 1937 therefore cannot be cited as stare decisis and
controlling as precedent without giving full effect to the emancipating
impact of the public policy and substantive provisions of the Labor
Relations and the Anti-Injunction Acts enacted in the 1930's.
It will be seen that this broad, friendly approach toward collective
bargaining agreements now permeates not only the Labor and Anti-
Injunction laws, but the entire gamut of the Pennsylvania statutory
and common Law on labor. This paper will first present a summary
analysis of the early English and pre-1931 Pennsylvania law on collec-
tive bargaining and the collective agreement. It will thereafter analyze
the effect of Pennsylvania's public policy in this field as announced by
legislation. The historical background in any specialized field of law is
usually developed to establish ruling case law and controlling precedent.
This paper, on the other hand, will explore the legal background to show
that restrictive, early English and Pennsylvania law no longer controls.
The principle of stare decisis in this field of law can only be applied after
according full credence and application to the Pennsylvania affirmative
about-face with respect to this subject matter.
I.
BACKGROUND OF ENGLISH AND PENNSYLVANIA LAW ON LABOR
AGREEMENTS.
Historically, the approach of the English law to collective bargain-
ing was hostile and negative. This approach spilled over into the law
of the American colonies, where it was received with approbation.
Pennsylvania was no exception.
2. Act of June 23, 1931, P.L. 926, provided in part that no court shall have juris-
diction to issue an injunction in a case involving a labor dispute. "Labor dispute"
is defined in Section 1(c) of that act to include "any controversy concerning terms
of employment or . . . the representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintain-
ing, changing or seeking to change the terms or conditions of employment relations,
or arising . . . out of the respective, interests of employer and employee."
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§211.1-211.13 (1952).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 206a-206r (1952).
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 4 [1958], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol3/iss4/1
JUNE 1958] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
The roots of the law of labor contracts dig deeply into an inimical
and barren soil of English background. The basic mood of early Eng-
lish law is one of repression, start at whatever point one will. In
this respect, it is indeed difficult to select precisely the right point of
beginning. The bygone centuries each provide their cases and their
statutes by the legion which suppress or else stifle concerted labor ac-
tivities. Suffice it to note that as far back as the year 1351, the Statute
of Laborers ' imposed, inter alia, criminal sanctions for the violation of
a labor contract. On the other hand, all other commercial and business
non-labor contractual violations during the 14th century were redress-
able only by civil damages. Thus, beginning with more than six cen-
turies ago and continuing thereon until recent years, the labor con-
tract under English law was relegated to the status of second class
citizenship in the realm of contract law.
As the centuries passed, mercantilism supplanted the feudal system;
and then the rise of the factory and industrial system .in turn spelled the
nemesis of mercantilism. The star of the individual entrepreneur was
in its ascendency. The new economic system depended on capital,
laissez faire, free enterprise, and the delicate interplay of unhampered
supply and demand. Collective labor action and the resultant labor
contract would, it was thought, result in economic disequilibrium and
imbalance. It would throw the law of supply and demand out of kilter.
A fortiori, it was a logical and simple step to declare concerted economic
endeavor by workers to improve their lot a conspiracy-a corrupt
agreement for an unlawful purpose. Criminal sanction would then
follow in order to vindicate the public wrong, and civil damages or the
voidance of the contract to compensate for the private legal hurt. This,
then, wasthe touchstone of redressing the damage to society and to the
individual. Under the criminal law, the concerted activities directed
toward achieving a labor contract was held to involve criminal con-
spiracy.6 Under the private or civil law the labor agreement was against
5. 23 EDw. 3, st. 1 (1351). This act reenacted the previously adopted Ordinance
of Laborers, 23 EDw. 3 (1349). Three other subsequent English major labor statutes,
just to mention a few, which imposed strict and unsympathetic rules during the suc-
ceeding centuries, were the Statute of Laborers, 5 ELuz., c. 4 (1562) ; and the Com-
bination Acts of 1799, 39 GEo. 3, c. 81, and of 1800, 40 GF.o. 3, c. 106. Several leading
English cases which stress this same shackling influence on concerted labor activities
are: The Tubwomen v. The Brewers of London (Rex v. Starling), 1 Keb. 655-675-
682, 83 Eng. Rep. 1167-1179-1184 (1665) ; Rex v. Journeymen Taylors of Cambridge,
8 Mod. 10, 88 Eng. Rep. 9 (1721) ; Rex v. Eccles, 1 Leach Cl. Cas. 274, 168 Eng.
Rep. 240 (1783).
An outstanding and scholarly, short, historical review of the English background
to labor law, which in part also reviews the above cited items, will be found in
LANDIS & MANOFF, LABOR LAW (2 ed. 1942).
6. Common law criminal conspiracy is defined as two or more persons combining,
either: "I. To accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose; 2. or to accomplish a pur-
pose not in itself criminal or unlawful by criminal or unlawful means. It is the
3
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public policy and therefore unenforceable and void as a restraint of
trade. 7
During the Colonial period and thereafter until 1869, Pennsyl-
vania in like manner espoused the doctrines of criminal conspiracy and
restraint of trade. Its courts held that concerted measures by workers
for their mutual economic benefit constituted unlawful activity. The
celebrated Philadelphia Cordwainers' case 8 decided in 1806 is a case in
point. The court found the defendant-workmen guilty of a criminal
conspiracy because they "did combine, conspire and confederate, and
unlawfully agree together . . . that they . . . would not .
work . . . but at a certain large price and rates.
The defendants were each fined. They could just as well have
been sentenced to a prison term. Recorder Levy, speaking for the
court, recognized that it was perfectly proper for each of the work-
men to request an individual wage increase, but as for the concerted
activities, he held:
.*. . a combination of workmen to raise their wages may be
considered from a two-fold point of view; one is the benefit them-
selves, the other to injure those who do not join their society. The
rule of law condemns both. [T]he rule in this case is pregnant
with sound sense and all the authorities are clear upon the subject.
In 1869, the Pennsylvania legislature declared it a legal right to
form and join labor unions.' Criminal liability for conspiracy was
thereafter abolished as a result of the respective enactment of three
statutes within approximately the next two decades.'" But civil lia-
bility for conspiracy nonetheless continued as of old." Pennsylvania
also continued to recognize and enforce the so-called "yellow-dog" or
"iron clad" contracts.' 2 By entering such a contract an employee, dur-
ing his entire term of employment, solemnly undertook not to join or
remain a member of a labor union. The employee further thereby ex-
pressly agreed that he would sever his employment relation if he joined
or remained in a labor organization.
unlawful combination or agreement that constitutes the offense, and no further overt
act is necessary." CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMEs § 126 (5th ed. 1952). See also
Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARv. L. REv. 393 (1921).
7. Cf. People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1835).
8. Commonwealth v. Pullis, Phila. Mayor's Ct. (1806); 3 COMMONS & GILMORE,
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 60-248 (1910).
9. Act of May 8, 1869, P.L. 1260.
10. Act of June 14, 1872, P.L. 1175; Act of April 20, 1876, P.L. 45; Act of June
16, 1891, P.L. 300.
11. Purvis v. Local 500, United Bro. of Carpenters and Joiners, 214 Pa. 348, 63
AtI. 585 (1906) ; Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 56 Atl. 327 (1903).
12. Flaccus v. Smith, 199 Pa. 128, 48 Atl. 894 (1901).
[VOL. 3: p. 441
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The year 1931 in some respects,' 3 and more so the year 1937,
marked a profound change in the spirit and the letter of Pennsylvania
law of collective bargaining and labor contracts. Two general remedial
statutes 1" dealing with broad areas of union-employer relationships and
problems, enacted in June, 1937, declared a positive public policy of en-
couraging collective bargaining and labor agreements in industrial and
commercial enterprises. Another statute promulgated the same sym-
pathetic policy in public utilities.3 A few days earlier in May 1937,
prior to the enactment of these two remedial statutes, the Pennsyl-
vania Legislature reversed the venerable common law canon then in
effect which required strict construction of statutes in derogation of the
common law.' Here again was a change in the law of Pennsylvania
which has a liberalizing impact on the present law on labor contracts.
Prior to this rule of liberal construction of statutes in derogation of
the common law, Pennsylvania applied the rule of strict construction,'17
or at least so interpreted that it would accord, as nearly as may be, with
the theretofore existing course of the common law.'
This paper will analyze the public policy and statutes of the labor
agreement in detail. It is important to recognize the principle that the
case law decided prior to 1937 is not controlling as stare decisis, and to
take into full account the impact of the 1937 labor acts dealing with
mediation, labor relations and labor injunctions.
II.
THE PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC POLICY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE LABOR
CONTRACT.
The two major Pennsylvania statutes of general application are
the Labor Relations Act and the Labor Anti-Injunction Act. A public
policy section will be found in each of these two statutes. These legisla-
tive policy statements declare in sweeping and felicitous terms that the
public policy of Pennsylvania is that of encouraging collective bar-
gaining and the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements. A
detailed analysis of this public policy is apropos.
13. See note 2 supra.
14. See notes 3 and 4 supra. In addition, the Labor Mediation Act of 1937, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 211.31-211.39 (1952), declares in Section 2 thereof that "it is
the public policy . . . to encourage . . . employees by their representatives to
make and maintain agreements concerning wages, hours, and conditions of employment,
and to settle all controversies arising out of the application of such agreements."
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 213.1-213.16 (1952).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 558 (1952).
17. Smith v. Altoona and Phillipsburg R. R. Co., 182 Pa. 139, 37 Atl. 930 (1897);
Keim v. City of Reading, 32 Pa. Super. 613 (1907).
18. Bridgeford v. Groh, 306 Pa. 566, 160 Atl. 451 (1932); Merrick v. Dupont,
285 Pa. 368, 132 Atl. 181 (1926).
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A. The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act.
The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act (hereinafter "Labor Act")
was enacted on June 1, 1937.19 Section 2 o declares the legislative
findings and public policy of the Labor Act. The Legislature finds,
inter alia, in Section 2(a) that "individual employes do not possess
actual liberty of contract," a situation which "substantially and
adversely affects the general welfare of the State. . ." In Section
2(b) the Labor Act declares that "protection by law of the right of
employes to organize and bargain collectively" removes sources and
encourages resolution of industrial strife, thereby restoring equality of
bargaining power. Section 2(c) promulgates the following public
policy in express and unequivocal terms, namely:
"(c) In the interpretation and application of this act and other-
wise, it is hereby declared to be the public policy of the State
to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining
and to protect the exercise of workers of full freedom of association
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment. . . . " (Emphasis added.)
The words "and otherwise" are pregnant with meaning and sig-
nificance with regard to their impact on the law of labor contract. The
Legislature, in choosing these words has mandated that the stated public
policy of encouraging collective bargaining and its ultimate goal of the
collective bargaining agreement must be integrated into the entire
body of Pennsylvania law,.no matter whether that law be the creature
of the Legislature or the lex non scripti of Pennsylvania. The term
"collective bargaining," too, should be construed in light of its tra-
ditional context, its traditional goals, and its traditional and accepted
meaning. In this respect, collective bargaining is primarily a means
to an end. The aim of collective bargaining is that of negotiating and
enforcing a collective labor agreement which establishes standards of
representation, wages, hours and conditions of employment. This,
then, is the real meaning and significance of the public policy of Penn-
sylvania, declared in the Labor Act and to be applied to the interpreta-
tion and application of that statute "and otherwise."
Decisional Pennsylvania law as pronounced by its appellate courts
recognizes the telling impact and consequences of this legislatively de-
clared public policy. Thus, Pennsylvania courts have held that the
object to be attained by a statute is the "authentic password" of a law.2'
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§211.1-211.13 (1952).
20. Id. § 211.2.
21. Commonwealth v. Calio, 155 Pa. Super. 355, 38 A.2d 351 (1944), which in
turn cites the Statutory Construction Act of May 28, 1937, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46,
§558 (1952).
[VOL. 3: p. 441
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In construing a statute, the courts will look to its background, reasons
for its enactment, the mischief which is to be remedied, and its object.22
Furthermore, the courts agree that the general design and the manifest
purpose of a statute will be the paramount objective of judicial con-
struction and statutory interpretation," so that a statute will be con-
strued to secure such an object and exclude every other. 4
Failure to give full effect to the public policy of the Labor Act and
the words "and otherwise" would also run counter to the rules of
statutory construction enacted in the Pennsylvania Statutory Con-
struction Act of May 28, 1937.25 The date of May 28, 1937 is im-
portant in that, among other things, except for statutes which are in
their nature penal, retroactive, tax, eminent domain, or jurisdictional
limitations upon courts, the act declares:
"The rule that laws in derogation of the common law are to
be strictly construed, shall have no application to the laws of
this Commonwealth hereafter enacted." 26 (Emphasis added.)
The Labor Act was enacted on June 1, 1937, and the Labor Anti-
Injunction Act was enacted on June 2, 1937. The Statutory Con-
struction Act enacted less than a week prior to June 2, 1937, has codi-
fied the rules of statutory construction. The provisions 27 of this
codification of the rules seem to give added effect to the words "or
otherwise" in Section 2(c) of the Labor Act, for the reasons which
follow:
22. Commonwealth v. Emerick, 373 Pa. 388, 96 A.2d 846 (1948) ; Rose Township
v. Hollobaigh, 179 Pa. Super. 248, 116 A.2d 323 (1955) ; Commonwealth v. Meinhart,
173 Pa. Super. 495, 98 A.2d 392 (1953). It is interesting to note that this canon
of statutory construction has its best known early exposition in Heydon's Case, 76
Eng. Rep. 637 (1584), wherein it was stated that ". . . four things are to be dis-
cerned and considered:-lst. What was the common law before the making of the
Act. 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not
provide. 3rd. What remedy The Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure
the disease of the Commonwealth. And 4th. The true reason of the remedy ..
23. Swartley v. Harris, 351 Pa. 116, 40 A.2d 409 (1944).
24. Kane v. Policemen's Relief and Pension Fund, 336 Pa. 540, 9 A2d 739 (1939).
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§501-602 (1952).
26. Id. § 558. The word "enactment" is dealt with in Section 502 in defining
"final enactment" as follows: "'Final enactment' or 'enacted finally' means the time
when the procedure required by the Constitution for the enactment of a bill into law
has been complied with." A bill becomes law after it has been passed by the General
Assembly and signed by the presiding officers of each House in the presence of that
House, and thereafter approved and signed by the Governor, or else approved by
two-thirds of all the members elected to each House after veto by the Governor if
the Assembly is in session. If a bill is not returned by the Governor within ten days
after it has been presented to him it will become law if the Assembly is in session.
If the General Assembly has adjourned, unless the Governor vetoes it within thirty
days after adjournment, the bill becomes law. PA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 4, 8 and 9;
and art. IV, § 15.
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 551 (1952),
7
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(1) The Statutory Construction Act, in Section 51 thereof, pro-
vides that the object of all interpretation is to effectuate legislative in-
tention.
(2) Section 51 further provides that wherever possible, every
law shall be construed to give effect to all its provisions. This provision
has been held to mean that every word must be given full effect unless
no other construction is possible."8 This provision means, too, that
the courts may not delete or disregard words contained in a statute.2 9
(3) The Statutory Construction Act, in Section 52(5) thereof,
further declares a presumption in ascertaining legislative intent is "that
the Legislature intends to favor the public interest as against any private
interest." It can be logically maintained that statutorily declared policy
coincides with the public interest insofar as judicial construction is
concerned. At this point, it is well to also note that Section 2(d) of the
Labor Act states that "all the provisions of this act shall be liberally
construed for the accomplishment of this purpose." o The stated
purpose, of course, is encouragement of collective bargaining and the
collective agreement.
(4) The Labor Act was enacted four days after the Statutory
Construction Act of May 28, 1937. Therefore, even though the
provisions of the Labor Act may be in derogation of the common law,
this statute must be liberally construed pursuant to the command of
Section 58 of the Statutory Construction Act.8 '
Several other sections of the Labor Act are also material in
analyzing the scope and effect of the Pennsylvania statutory scheme of
encouraging collective bargaining and the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The terms "labor organization" and "labor dispute" are sweep-
ingly defined in the Labor Act." Section 5, in the same favorable and
all-embracing mood, defines the rights of employees as follows: "Em-
28. Sterling v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 538, 106 A.2d 793 (1954) ; American Brake
Shoe Co. v. District Lodge 9, 373 Pa. 164. 94 A.2d 884 (1953).
29. Allentown v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm., 173 Pa. Super. 219, 96
A.2d 157 (1953); Commonwealth v. One 1939 Cadillac Sedan, 158 Pa. Super. 392, 45
A.2d 406 (1946).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.2(d) (1952).
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 558 (1952).
32. "Labor organization" is defined in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §211.3(f), and
"labor dispute" is defined in Section 211.3(h). The Labor Act defines labor organi-
zation to mean ". . . any organization . . . , and which exists for the purpose in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning . . . wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment or conditions of work .... ." The term "labor dispute" is
defined in the act to include ". . . any controversy concerning (1) terms, tenure
or conditions of employment, or concerning (2) the association or representation of
persons in negotiation, fixing, maintaining, changing . . . terms or conditions of
employment ..
448 [VOL. 3: p. 441
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ployes shall have the right to self-organization, . . . to bargain
collectively . . . and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining." "
Continuing on this same theme, Section 6(1) (e)34 makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer ". . . to refuse to bargain col-
lectively with the representatives of his employes, . . . ." Section
7(a) ' of the Labor Act is also material. It provides that collective
bargaining representatives in an appropriate unit shall be
". * * the exclusive representatives of all the employes in such
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employ-
ment..
The Labor Act recognizes and applies the equitable doctrine of "clean
hands." The act declares that any party filing charges of unfair labor
practices shall forfeit his rights if he has, in turn, also engaged in the
same unfair labor practices."'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized that a prime
purpose of the Labor Act is to provide a method of encouraging the
collective labor agreement." Individual contracts which conflict with
this policy must fail. Members of a union are bound by the collective
agreement which may govern all aspects of labor-management re-
lations. These broad aspects of coverage are comprehended in section
7(a) of the Labor Act, namely: rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, or other conditions of employment .s The statute further directs
that the collective bargaining for a labor contract must be sincere and
participated in with a full measure of good faith." Pennsylvania public
policy favoring collective bargaining is so positive in nature, that even
a strike in violation of the collective agreement does not necessarily
terminate the employer's duty to bargain with the striking union.'
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.5 (1952).
34. Id. § 211.6(1) (e). Union unfair labor practices which involve, among other
items, either intimidation, force, or seizure of property for the purpose of negotiating
collective agreements are included within the subsections of Section 211.6(2).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.7(a) (1952).
'36. Id. §211.10.
37. Shafer's Petition, 347 Pa. 130, 31 A.2d 537 (1943).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §211.7(a) (1952). Prentice Unempl. Comp. Case,
161 Pa. Super. 630, 56 A.2d 295. See also Kinter v. Unempl. Comp. Bd., 180 Pa.
Super. 529, 119 A.2d 639 (1956); Pusa Unempl. Comp. Case, 178 Pa. Super. 348,
115 A.2d 791 (1955) ; O'Donnel Unempl. Comp. Case, 173 Pa. Super. 263, 98 A.2d
406 (1953) ; Barclay White Co. v. Unempl. Comp. Bd., 159 Pa. Super. 94, 46 A.2d 598(1946).
39. Hogan Unempl. Comp. Case, 169 Pa. Super. 554, 83 A.2d 386 (1951).
40. Lancaster Yellow Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 371 Pa. 49,
88 A.2d 886 (1952).
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B. The Pennsylvania Labor Anti-Injunction Act.
The Pennsylvania Labor Anti-Injunction Act (hereinafter "Anti-
Injunction Act") was first enacted on June 2, 1937.41 This statute
either deprives or else restricts the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania
Courts to afford judicial relief in certain areas involving labor relations
and labor contracts. Section 2 42 of the act declares legislative findings
and a public policy which go hand-in-hand with the findings and
policy of the Labor Act. In Section 2 (a) "' of the Anti-Injunction
Act, in like manner as in the Labor Act, the Legislature declares among
other things that:
c * the individual unorganized worker is commonly help-
less to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his free-
dom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions
of employment, wherefore . . . though he should be free to de-
cline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full
freedom of . . . self-organization . . . to negotiate the terms
and conditions of employment, and that he shall be free from inter-
ference . . . of employers . . . in . . . self-organization
for the purpose of collective bargaining.
Section 2 (b) " of the Anti-Injunction Act decries equity pro-
ceedings which permit ex-parte injunction relief in labor disputes. The
act provides that such equity proceedings should be preceded by notice
to and hearing of the parties, including the right of confrontation and
cross-examination.
In defining the terms of the act, the definition of "labor dispute"
therein is all-important. Section 3 (c) " of the act defines "labor dis-
pute" in broad, encompassing terms, so as to include inter alia: "
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing . . terms, of employ-
ment or concerning employment or any other controversy arising out
of the respective interests of employer and employee, . . . ." The
so-called "yellow dog" contract is declared by Section 5 "" to be con-
trary to the public policy of the act and unenforceable either at law
or in equity.
Section 6 " of the Anti-Injunction Act provides that the traditional
power of the Pennsylvania courts of equity will be completely denied in
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 206a-206r (1952).
42. Id. § 206b.
43. Id. §206b(a).
44. Id. § 206b(b).
45. Id. § 206c(c).
46. Id. § 206e.
47. Id. § 206f. The equity courts of Pennsylvania have jurisdiction solely by
virtue of statutory authorization. Most of the labor unions in Pennsylvania are
[VOL. 3: p. 441
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any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, notwithstanding
any promise or contract to the contrary, in a number of enumerated
matters, including: "(f) organizing themselves, forming, joining or
assisting in labor organizations bargaining collectively with an em-
ployer . . or for the purpose of collective bargaining..
Section 6 (n) 4" further expressly excepts from the operation of
the canon of interpretation knows as "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius," the enumerated unenjoinable acts in Section 6. This subsec-
tion (n) expressly provides that the specific enumeration of unenjoinable
acts shall not be interpreted to authorize injunctive relief where any
act was otherwise unenjoinable prior to the enactment of the Anti-
Injunction Act.
Section 7 " of the act forbids the granting of injunctive relief in
a labor dispute on the grounds that participating parties are engaged
in a conspiracy or in unlawful combination. Appeals to the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court are expedited by the Anti-Injunction Act. The
statute provides in Section 15 " thereof, that such appeals shall take
"precedence over all matters, except older matters of the same charac-
ter."
The Amendatory Act of 1939 "' amended the Labor Anti-Injunc-
tion Act in two important respects insofar as the subject of this article
is concerned. The Amendatory Act added to Section 4 of the 1937
statute a subsection which provided, inter alia, that:
c. . .this act shall not apply in any case-
"(a), Involving a labor dispute, as defined herein, which is in
disregard, breach, or violation of, or which tends to procure the
disregard, breach, or violation of, a valid subsisting labor agree-
ment . . . Provided, however that the complaining person has
not, during the term of the said agreement, committed an act as
defined in both of the aforesaid acts (the Pennsylvania and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Acts) as an unfair labor practice or violated
any of the terms of the said agreement."
"(c) Where any person, . (or) labor organization engages
in a course of conduct intended . . . to coerce an employer to
commit a violation of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act of
1937 or the National Labor Relations Act of 1935."
unincorporated voluntary associations. Jurisdiction over such associations was origi-
nally conferred on the Courts of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania by the Act of June
16, 1836, P.L. 784.
48. Id. § 206f(n).
49. Id. § 2 06g.
50. Id. § 206o.
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §206d(a-d) (1952).
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Insofar as the application of the above amendments contained in the
1939 Amendatory Act, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held
that these amendments declare both procedural as well as substantive
changes. Thus, the Court has held that the procedural prerequisites
of hearing, confrontation, cross-examination and like matters do not
apply to those items which fall within the terms of the 1939 amend-
ments .2
The framework, public policy, substance and spirit of the Anti-
Injunction Act just as in the Labor Relations Act, is at odds with
the restrictive common law doctrines of conspiracy and restraint of trade
insofar as collective labor action is involved. Although the cited 1939
Amendatory Act has somewhat expanded the area in which equity
courts may grant injunctive relief in labor litigation, the courts on the
whole have been deprived of their traditional jurisdiction to grant relief.
The public policy declaration has not been amended. Insofar as the
status and enforceability of the collective bargaining agreement, Section
4(a)" of the act as amended has accorded the "valid subsisting labor
agreement" more, rather than less, standing and respectability than it
had prior to the 1939 amendments. This is so for two reasons. In
the first place, the Amendatory Act declares that equitable relief is
available to enforce a valid subsisting labor agreement absent violation
on the part of the complainant of terms of that agreement or of the
practices enumerated as unfair labor practices in Section 6 of the Labor
Act. Then, too, the Amendatory Act specifically relates the stated goals
of the Labor Act with those of the Anti-Injunction Act.
Labor injunctions were until the recent past traditionally popular
because of their speed and finality, as an effective weapon against con-
certed labor activity. The Anti-Injunction Act has helped to unshackle
the labor contract and collective action from the unsympathetic grip of
pre-1931 Pennsylvania law-primarily common law-by: (a) pro-
hibiting injunctive relief against any particular item enumerated in
Section 5, 6 and 7 of the act; (b) by expressly negating the common
law rules of conspiracy, restraint of trade, and enforceability of the
yellow-dog contract as these items apply to labor relations; and (c)
by declaring a sympathetic and broad policy which encourages and nur-
tures collective labor action and the prime end of such collective action-
the collective bargaining agreement. In Pennsylvania today, the labor
injunction may be granted only in strict conformity with the provisions
52. Carnegie Illinois Steel Corp. v. United States Steelworkers of America, 353
Pa. 420, 45 A.2d 857 (1946).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 206d(a) (1952).
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of the Anti-Injunction Act and pursuant to the stated public policy of
that act.
5 4
III.
CONCLUSION.
All Pennsylvania law relating to collective bargaining agreements
must today be decided and construed in a manner which is consistent
with the public policy of the State to encourage collective bargaining
and its end goal, the labor agreement.
The pre-1931 Pennsylvania rules of law on collective action and
collective agreements, established partly by statute but primarily by the
common law, were harsh and repressive. They shackled collective
action. They presented practical and sometimes insurmountable ob-
stacles to the negotiation, consummation, and enforcement of the labor
agreement. The strong arm of equity, in ex-parte proceedings based
on cold, calculated ofttime equivocation of affidavit alone, all too often
enjoined concerted labor activities. It was a poor lawyer, indeed, who
could not draft an acceptable affidavit. Some of the grounds on which
equitable relief was premised in the past included: breach of yellow-dog
contracts ", "black looks;" " and "moral coercion." 17 Theoretically,
one might indeed argue that the common law was in fact liberal; that
it was actually flexible; that it was true to the times; and that the judges
were not as conservative as the leading cases would have one think.
And it might also be shown that here and there one could find an
adjudication or a judgment which shone like a beacon in the encourage-
ment of what we today recognize as desirable concerted action. 8 But
these instances seem to be merely "sports," exceptions to the general
rule. The short answer to this theoretical argument on behalf of the
liberality and flexibility of the common law on concerted activities by
labor is: "that is the trouble. It is theoretical insofar as Pennsylvania
law is concerned. In the vernacular, 'it just ain't so'." As the writer
sees it, there is no arguing the encouragement or even the countenancing
of collective bargaining when the entire gamut of collective action is
subject to a strict and unsympathetic application of the common law
doctrines of conspiracy and restraint of trade.
54. Ibid.
55. Flaccus v. Smith, 199 Pa. 128, 48 Atl. 894 (1901).
56. O'Neill v. Behanna, 182 Pa. 236, 37 Atl. 843 (1897).
57. Edman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 56 Atl. 327 (1903). Cf. Wick China Co. v.
W. E. Brown, 168 Pa. 449, 25 At. 492 (1894).
58. Northern Railway Co. v. Brosseau, 286 Fed. 414 (N.D. 1923).
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The author of one of the most frequently cited and accepted texts on
American rules of statutory construction, states with reference to the
telling impact of public policy:
"Public policy retains a place of great importance in the proc-
ess of statutory interpretation, and the tendency of courts has
always been to favor an interpretation which is consistent with
public policy. In fact it may be safely asserted that the basis of
all interpretative rules in regard to strict and liberal interpretation
are founded upon public policy in one form or another." 59
On May 28, 1937, the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act
was enacted. It declared, inter alia, that in general, statutes in deroga-
tion of the common law will no longer be strictly construed. Within
one week after the enactment of the Statutory Construction Act, the
Legislature enacted the two general labor statutes which have been the
subject matter of this article-the Labor Relations Act and the Anti-
Injunction Act. These remedial statutes unequivocally declared the
public policy of Pennsylvania to be the encouragement of collective bar-
gaining and the resultant collective agreement. The 1937 Labor
Relations Act and Anti-Injunction Act thereby figuratively and actually
sounded a legislative death knell to the common law doctrines of con-
spiracy and restraint of trade, at least to the harshness of approach and
application where these doctrines concerned a labor dispute or the
negotiation or effectuation of a labor contract. This legislative policy
was further declared to apply beyond the terms of these two acts-it
was applied to the Labor Relations Act "and otherwise." The orthodox
common law rules on contract, with all that it involves: offer, ac-
ceptance, consideration, assignment, breach, damages, discharge, and
the like are included in those two words "and otherwise." It is therefore
necessary, in light of the public policy since 1937, to interpret, construe
and apply contract law to the labor contract in a sympathetic and favor-
able manner wherever reasonably possible. Thus the labor contract
stands separate and apart from other contracts or consensual agree-
ments. The tables are reversed. The place of the collective bargaining
contract is now unique in the scheme of Pennsylvania contract law.
59. 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 125, 126 (3d ed.
1943).
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